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Abstract
Terrorism has large social costs that are difficult to quantify for the well-known problems of eliciting
people's preferences for public goods. We use the LSA to assess these costs in utility and monetary
terms. Based on combined cross-section time-series data, we estimate the costs of terrorism for France
and the British Isles. We find large negative effects of terrorism on life satisfaction that translate into
considerable compensating surpluses for a hypothetical reduction in terrorism, in particular for the
serious conflict in Northern Ireland. The effects of terrorism are robust and differ across groups in
accordance with prior expectations.
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1. Introduction 
Terrorism has large social costs. It is undisputed that fear, grief and mourning, as well as 
the negative economic consequences of terrorist activities, reduce people’s welfare. 
However, how valuable is freedom from terrorism? Security, or the absence of terrorism, is 
a fundamental public good and one of the primary justifications for the existence of the 
state. Its provision competes with other public goods, and agents want to know its 
valuation relative to private goods and other public services. When the costs imposed on 
people by terrorist activities are known, the government can be expected to make better 
decisions on how many resources should be allocated to deal with terrorism.12 This holds 
even if the government is not viewed as a social-welfare maximizing agent, but is seen to 
act in a setting characterized by political competition. However, it is commonplace that 
individuals have no incentive to disclose their true demand for non-excludable goods; it is 
advantageous to understate demand when it positively affects contribution requirements 
and to overstate demand otherwise. Therefore, some economists are very pessimistic as to 
whether it is possible to assess people’s preferences for public goods and bads: “[T]he very 
essence of the public goods problem is that there is no way these preferences can be 
determined” (Due and Friedlaender 1973, p. 53; emphasis added). 
In contrast to this negative view, a vast literature exists, reflecting extensive research and 
considerable progress in valuing public goods in monetary terms. Essentially, two avenues 
have been pursued: revealed preference methods (examples are the hedonic method or the 
defense expenditure approach) on the one hand and stated preference methods (especially 
the contingent valuation method) on the other hand. However, despite their ingenuity, 
these approaches have serious flaws, especially in the context of terrorism (see the earlier 
working paper version of this paper for an extensive discussion of the promises and pitfalls 
of the standard non-market valuation techniques). 
In this paper, we propose the Life Satisfaction Approach (LSA) as a potentially effective 
complementary method to value the psychic costs of terrorism. The LSA correlates the 
degree of public goods or public bads with individuals’ reported subjective well-being and 
evaluates them directly in terms of life satisfaction, as well as relative to the effect of 
income on life satisfaction. This approach obviates some of the major difficulties inherent 
in both the revealed preference and stated preference methods. As it is not based on 
observed behavior, the underlying assumptions are less restrictive and non-use values can 
– to a certain extent – be measured. Furthermore, individuals are not asked to value the 
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public good directly, but to evaluate their general life satisfaction. This is presumably a 
cognitively less demanding task, does not evoke answers considered desirable by the 
persons asked, and there is no reason to expect strategic behavior.2 
This paper proceeds in two steps. First, we explain the key characteristics of the LSA and 
discuss conceptual issues (section 2). Second, we present our application to terrorism 
(section 3). The utility losses caused by terrorist activities are estimated and monetized for 
France and the British Isles3 using combined cross-section time-series data. France is the 
Western European country with the highest number of recorded international terrorist 
incidents in the last quarter of the 20th century.4 Similarly, the terrorist conflict in Northern 
Ireland, the so-called ‘Troubles’, affected not only Northern Ireland but also Great Britain 
and the Republic of Ireland. Individuals in a region prone to terrorist activities are shown 
to suffer considerable utility losses. Section 4 offers concluding remarks. 
2. The LSA to valuing public goods 
2.1 The basic concept 
Influenced by the positivistic movement in philosophy, standard economics is based on an 
“objectivistic” position (see, e.g., Sen 1986). Individual utility is inferred from actual 
behavior and subjectivist experience, as captured by surveys, is rejected as being not 
objectively observable and therefore “unscientific”. The axiomatic approach holds that the 
choices made by individuals provide all the information required to infer the utility of 
outcomes. However, this position restricts the questions that can be addressed. It is, for 
example, not possible to discriminate between competing theories that predict the same 
behavioral patterns, but differ in what they put forward as people’s utility level (Frey and 
Stutzer 2005). Moreover, conceptions about individuals’ preferences or utility functions 
remain vague and the valuation of public goods is hampered (Arrow 1958, pp. 8-9; 
Schelling 1968, pp. 143-144). Revealed preference cannot be applied in all cases of 
interest and non-use values leave no behavioral trace. It is, therefore, no accident that non-
market valuation is a field in economics where surveys have been widely used. 
The recent development of happiness research in economics (for surveys see Frey and 
Stutzer 2002 a, b; Layard 2006, Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006, Clark, Frijters and Shields 
2007) offers a complementary approach to the challenged revealed preference approach. 
Due to extensive work by numerous psychologists spanning many decades (see, e.g., 
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Diener et al. 1999; Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz 1999), the great progress made in the 
measurement of experienced utility has gained recognition.5 Thus, reported subjective 
well-being can serve as an empirically adequate and valid approximation for individually 
experienced welfare. Hence, it is an obvious and straightforward strategy to directly 
evaluate public goods in experienced utility terms. Moreover, by measuring the marginal 
utility of a public good or the marginal disutility of a public bad, as well as the marginal 
utility of income, the trade-off ratio between income and the public good can be calculated. 
In order to use life satisfaction data to value public goods, several necessary conditions 
have to be met that we make explicit in the following: 
(i) Life satisfaction scores should contain information on the respondent’s global 
evaluation of his or her life. It is necessary in other words, that life satisfaction not merely 
be an argument in the utility function, or a subutility function, as Kimball and Willis 
(2006) conjecture for measures of current affect. 
(ii) Reported life satisfaction contains sufficient information (relative to noise) about true 
individual welfare that statistical research is fruitful. There is substantial evidence for this. 
Measures of reported subjective well-being passed a series of validation exercises, 
revealing, e.g., that people reporting high subjective well-being suffer less from 
hypertension (Blanchflower and Oswald 2007), or are less likely to commit suicide 
(Koivumaa-Honkanen et al. 2001). Moreover, reported life satisfaction is associated with 
activation asymmetry between the right and left prefrontal cortex and between the right 
and left amygdale (Urry et al. 2004). 
(iii) Respondents’ evaluations or appraisals of their life are meant to refer to present life 
across all domains. This focus on the present situation is often implied by the wording of 
the question, sometimes even including an extension like ‘these days’, ‘now’ or 
‘nowadays’. 
(iv) Life satisfaction scores are reported on an ordinal scale. Using adequate statistical 
techniques like ordered probit or ordered logit, the ordinal information is sufficient to 
calculate a compensating surplus. However, in many applications, similar results are 
obtained when interpreting life satisfaction scores in cardinal terms (Frey and Stutzer 
2000; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004). This is also the case here. For ease of 
interpretation, we report results from least square regressions, and only refer to the results 
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based on ordered probit regressions when presenting the results for the compensating 
surplus. 
(v) A further key assumption refers to the comparability of life satisfaction data across 
groups of people and over time. The debate about interpersonal comparisons of well-being 
is far-ranging and elaborate in traditional welfare economics (see the contributions in 
Elster and Roemer 1991). There are two reasons why interpersonal comparability is less of 
an issue in the practical statistical application of the LSA. First, validity studies 
demonstrate that self-reports of subjective well-being are not just artifacts of individual 
specific response behavior but are related to shared standards of evaluation. For example, it 
has been found that people who rate themselves as happy are also rated as happy by friends 
and family members, as well as by spouses (e.g., Lepper 1998). Second, interpersonal 
comparability at the level of the single individual is not a necessary condition for valuing 
public goods in the proposed framework. It is sufficient if individual specific response 
frames do not systematically vary between different groups exposed to different levels of 
the public good, either across space or over time (e.g., Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006). 
Under these assumptions, reported subjective well-being data can be used to assess 
individuals’ preferences for public goods or externalities. The public good or the 
externality faced by an individual is included as an additional argument in a micro-
econometric life satisfaction function. The estimated coefficients can be interpreted as 
marginal utilities of the public goods or the marginal disutilities of the public bads. 
Together with estimates for the marginal utility of income, the marginal rate of substitution 
between income and the public good can be calculated. Because the indifference curve 
over income and the public good is estimated directly, both relevant welfare measures, the 
equivalent surplus and the compensating surplus, can be computed even for inframarginal 
changes in the provision of the public good, without the need of auxiliary assumptions. 
The LSA can be used to value a wide range of different public goods and bads, negative 
and positive externalities. Other studies based on a similar approach value externalities in 
the environmental realm. Examples are Van Praag and Baarsma (2005), assessing the 
effect of noise nuisance, and Welsch (2002), estimating the effect of urban air pollution.  
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2.2 Identification of utility changes 
As the preceding discussion suggests, the LSA is a potentially effective non-market 
valuation technique. In the following, we discuss several identification issues. 
Omitted variables. The LSA, like the revealed preference methods, is not immune to 
possible spurious correlations that are the result of omitted variables. If differences in self-
reported life satisfaction are explained by cross-sectional differences in the public good, 
the estimates may be severely biased due to unobserved factors that co-vary with life 
satisfaction and the public good. For concreteness, consider terrorism. Imagine that people 
in terrorism-prone regions report a lower life satisfaction, on average, than their 
counterparts in peaceful areas. Obviously, the regions differ from each other in various 
respects apart from the level of terrorist activities which are likely to influence the life 
satisfaction of the residents. 
There are two ways of addressing this problem, though it cannot be completely resolved. 
First, the use of data with panel structure allows for the control of time-invariant region-
specific differences in life satisfaction, as well as area-independent temporal variations. 
Still, there may be time-variant regional effects that are correlated with happiness and the 
variable of concern, be it causal or not. For example, unemployment among young men 
and a general lack of opportunities during an economic downturn could further recruitment 
in terrorist groups and simultaneously depress life satisfaction in the affected regions. A 
second way, therefore, is to control for potentially collinear variables. However, a lack of 
adequate indicators often limits this procedure. Government reactions to terrorist activities, 
like curfews and curtailing of civil liberties, are likely to entail utility losses, but are 
difficult to operationalize.6 
Compensating variation. According to the premise of the hedonic method, individuals 
(without firm-specific investments and land ownership) exposed to a public bad or 
negative externalities are compensated in private markets, above all in the labor and 
housing market. This compensation has a countervailing effect on life satisfaction. In 
equilibrium, it is predicted that all public goods and public bads are capitalized in land (or 
rents) and wages and, consequently, life satisfaction is equalized across regions. However, 
this does not mean that the positive (negative) effect of a public good (bad) would not 
affect residents’ well-being. It is just that a positive (negative) effect is equally distributed 
among them. Having said this, one has to take into consideration that, in reality, various 
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restrictions, as well as moving and transaction costs, are likely to prevent complete 
arbitrage/equalization. Moreover, landowners (and employees with firm-specific 
investments) only have a costly exit option from locations that are negatively affected by a 
public bad or an externality. These residual effects are captured in reports of subjective 
well-being studied across regions (see also Van Praag and Baarsma 2005). However, the 
LSA is not restricted to these residual effects. In fact, it can be applied with any degree of 
compensation, as long as the channels of compensation are accounted for. As income, an 
important channel of compensation, is usually included in happiness functions, it is mainly 
rent differentials that could have an offsetting impact. The LSA is applied to the best 
advantage when there is little or no compensation. In these situations, the hedonic method 
breaks down. In contrast, the LSA works well. Biases due to compensation are most likely 
to be minor when annual intra- and interregional fluctuations are studied rather than 
variation across regions or countries. Empirically, this is possible in repeated cross-section 
analyses as, for example, conducted in our application in section 3. 
Spatial resolution. A critical element of the analysis is the choice of spatial units or regions 
across which changes in life satisfaction are identified. For some externalities, the regional 
boundaries are obvious and the spatial choice does not pose any further problem. For 
example, although noise nuisance might be perceived in another manner by different 
people, it can be objectively measured and located. This is also true for other externalities 
that are of a technological kind, in particular externalities in the environmental realm. For 
social externalities, like externalities of education, cultural amenities, crime or terrorism, it 
is far more difficult to draw boundaries. Terrorism, for example, is explicitly “conceived to 
have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target of 
the act” (Hoffman 1998, p. 38; see also Wilkinson 2000, p. 12, among others). In this case, 
one has to ask whether the climate of fear is confined to a legally or geographically defined 
region and where, if at all, empathy for the victims ends? This is a serious problem, as the 
estimated effects crucially depend on the spatial units chosen. Suppose, for example, a 
bomb explodes in the crowded centre of a small Northern Irish town and kills a large 
number of civilians. This terrorist incidence can affect people’s well-being in different 
ways: for example, it can be taken as an indication of a new wave of terrorist attacks all 
over the British Isles and the atrocity shocks people everywhere to the same extent. In that 
case, it is quite likely that life satisfaction is depressed everywhere in Great Britain and in 
Northern Ireland to the same extent. The effect of the incident on individuals’ well-being 
then cannot be identified across these two regions. If, on the other hand, only people in 
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Northern Ireland are affected by an incident taking place in Northern Ireland, and no 
spillovers occur, the average decrease in life satisfaction due to terrorism can be fully 
identified. Therefore, the more incidents take place that only affect residents in one region, 
i.e., the lower the regional spillovers, the more appropriately the effects can be measured. 
However, the average treatment effect for people affected by terrorism is also 
underestimated if the spatial resolution is too coarse. In this latter case, people not affected 
by terrorism are wrongly taken into account as victims. 
The discussion makes clear that knowledge of the actual situation and accurate definition 
of the regions across which the utility loss is identified are essential. In our empirical 
analysis, it seems reasonable to distinguish three regions for both France and the British 
Isles. The pattern of terrorist activity is relatively homogenous within these regions but 
different across them. However, in order to test the sensitivity of the results to the choice 
of spatial resolution, we also replicate the analysis with data on a smaller scale. In the case 
of France, the three regions are Ile-de-France (which includes Paris), Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur (including Corsica) and the remainder of France. Many terrorist incidents are 
clearly confined to Paris. The city was plagued by attacks on foreign ambassadors, other 
diplomats and government officials, as well as the headquarters or domestic branches of 
firms. Similarly, most attacks of the Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse (FLNC) 
were perpetrated in Corsica rather than in continental France. In the case of the British 
Isles, the three regions are Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The 
pattern of terrorist activity clearly differs across these regions. Even though republican 
groups carried the conflict to Great Britain, Northern Ireland experienced violence on a 
much larger scale. Loyalist groups, such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), its splinter 
group the Loyalist Volunteer Force (ULF), and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), 
limited their activities largely to Northern Ireland. In contrast to France, London has no 
special position with respect to terrorist activity (at least in the case of terrorist activity 
related to the Northern Ireland conflict). For example, the attacks with the highest death 
toll recorded in a single day occurred in Birmingham rather than in London (the 
Birmingham pub bombings of 1974). 
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3. Effects of terrorism on life satisfaction  
3.1 Data 
3.1.1 Data sources and sample selection 
Our main variables are people’s self-reported life satisfaction and income, as well as 
various indicators of terrorism. The former are taken from the Euro-Barometer Survey 
Series (1970-2002), which interviews a random cross-section sample of Europeans each 
year. Individual life satisfaction is elicited with the following question: “On the whole, are 
you very satisfied [4], fairly satisfied [3], not very satisfied [2], or not at all satisfied [1] 
with the life you lead?” The question was asked every year from 1973 to 2002 except for 
1974, 1981, 1995 and 1996. The observations are assigned to the regions of interest, 
according to the respondents’ place of residence. However, all observations from South-
East France are excluded for 1979 and 1987 because they cannot be properly assigned to 
the different regions. Similarly, observations from the year 1973 are not included in the 
estimations for the British Isles, because the Northern Irish sub-sample is included in the 
sample of Great Britain. 
The Euro-Barometer Survey Series also contains information concerning the income 
situation of the respondents; concretely, they are classified into between 6 and 12 classes 
of household income. The class size and number of classes varies considerably between 
countries and surveys. Therefore, we translate the original income class information into a 
number, which represents the value at the mid-point of the respective class interval. The 
values are converted into 2004 U.S. dollars. Because the highest income class is open-
ended, respondents that fall into this income class are excluded. In order to capture the 
effect of household size on equivalence income, the square root of household size is 
included in the estimation equations. Furthermore, a set of personal characteristics is 
incorporated, including sex, age, number of children, marital status, employment status and 
the type of community in which the respondent lives.7 Respondents aged below 15 are 
excluded. The sample of the baseline regressions contains a total of 100,382 observations 
for which a complete set of data for the main variables is available. The number of 
observations is 30,244 for Great Britain, 7,891 for Northern Ireland, 24,185 for the 
Republic of Ireland, and 38,062 for France. 
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In order to capture the intensity of the terrorist activity in different regions and years, we 
use two distinct terrorism indicators: the number of reported terrorist attacks and the 
number of fatalities. 
The first indicator is constructed on the basis of the RAND St. Andrews Chronology of 
International Terrorism (see, e.g., Hoffman and Hoffman 1995; made publicly available 
by the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism on its 
homepage (www.mipt.org)), the TWEED Terrorism in Western Europe: Event Data-
project (see Engene 2007) and statistics on the Security Related Incidents in Northern 
Ireland provided by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI; www.psni.police.uk). 
The fatalities variable is constructed on the basis of the RAND data and a comprehensive 
list of deaths resulting from the conflict in Northern Ireland; the list has been compiled by 
Sutton (1994) and updated by the Conflict Archive on the Internet (www.cain.ulst.ac.uk). 
A detailed description of the terrorism indicators in the different regions is provided in the 
following sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. 
3.1.2 Terrorism indicators for France 
In the case of France, both the incident variable and the fatalities variable are entirely 
constructed on the basis of the RAND data. Every reported incident contains a short 
description with – in the majority of cases – the exact location of the incident. This allows 
us to assign the incidents (and fatalities) to a particular region. Only 11 incidents cannot be 
attributed to a region in the case of France, and 16 incidents in the case of the United 
Kingdom. The RAND data are restricted to international terrorism. However, international 
terrorism is broadly defined and includes attacks by Corsican separatist groups in France 
(as well as Northern Irish groups in Great Britain), as well as attacks by domestic terrorist 
groups whenever foreigners are involved. In France, for example, several attacks are 
recorded for which the Action Directe (AD) claimed credit, especially in the mid 1980s 
when the AD tried to ally itself with the German Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF). Some rather 
bizarre attacks, such as attacks on international computer firms by the Comité Liquidant ou 
Détournant les Ordinateurs (Committee for Liquidation of Computers, CLODO) or the 
bombing of gas pipelines by the Comité d'Action Viticole (Action Committee of 
Winegrowers, CAV), fall into the same category. But many state-sponsored terrorist 
activities also took place on French territory. An example is the murder of the former 
Iranian Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar in Paris in 1991 by a hit-squad which, according 
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to the French investigating judge, was carried out under the direct orders of the Iranian 
regime (Wilkinson 2000, p. 66). Furthermore, France was plagued with the spillover of 
Basque terrorism into France and the spillover of activities by the Groupe Islamic Armée 
(GIA), as well as incidents related to the Middle East. Although international terrorism is 
broadly defined and plays an important role in France, the RAND data do not reflect the 
whole extent of the terror situation in France. For the years in our sample, the TWEED 
data, focusing on domestic terrorism, record 2,463 incidents; the RAND data, in contrast, 
record only 506 incidents. In the case of France, because the TWEED data contain no 
information on the geographical location of an incident the RAND data cannot be 
supplemented with the TWEED data. For France, the following analysis rests on the 
assumptions that international terrorist attacks reflect the pattern and evolution of terrorism 
more generally and that it is mainly the international terrorist attacks that have negative 
effects on life satisfaction (probably because they are more severe). The latter conjecture is 
supported by the fact that international attacks are indeed more often fatal than domestic 
attacks. Although the RAND data contain fewer incidents than the TWEED data, more 
fatalities are recorded (147 in the RAND data compared to 111 in the TWEED data). The 
former conjecture is supported by a relatively high correlation between the RAND data and 
the TWEED data. The correlation coefficient for the number of incidents is 0.67 and the 
correlation coefficient for the number of fatalities is 0.80. Figures 1 and 2 depict the annual 
number of attacks and the annual number of fatalities for Paris, the region Provence-Alpes-
Côte d’Azur and the remainder of France separately. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
In Paris and the rest of France, there is a decrease in the number of attacks over the whole 
period; in the region Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur the number of attacks peaks in the 
second half of the 1980s. Compared to the other regions, Paris experienced around four 
times as many terrorist attacks. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The number of fatalities has been on the decrease in all three regions of France, in the 
remainder of France especially since the mid-1980s; again, most deaths occurred in Paris. 
3.1.3 Terrorism indicators for the British Isles 
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Terrorist attacks. The RAND data are also an important building block in constructing the 
terrorism variables for the British Isles. Most reported incidents in Great Britain were 
related to the Northern Ireland conflict, the “Troubles”, and were committed by the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and, to a lesser extent, by the Irish National 
Liberation Army (INLA). In 1972, the PIRA moved its bombing campaign to Great 
Britain. The first of many sporadic, but mostly spectacular, PIRA attacks was a bomb 
planted at Aldershot military barracks, killing seven and wounding five civilians belonging 
to the support staff, two of whom subsequently died. A comparison of the RAND data with 
the comprehensive list of fatalities compiled by Sutton (1994) shows that most attacks 
related to the Troubles that have been perpetrated in Great Britain are recorded in the 
RAND data: 87% of the persons killed in Great Britain and recorded on Sutton’s (1994) 
list, are also to be found in the RAND data. Moreover, the fraction of 87% even 
underestimates the congruence for fatal attacks because, in contrast to the RAND data, 
Sutton’s (1994) list also contains terrorists who died in premature bomb explosions, 
political activists who died in hunger strikes and people who died in the aftermath of an 
attack. As an example, the RAND data record a bomb attack on March 27th, 1976, in a 
crowded exhibition hall in London that injured over 80 persons but killed no one, at least 
not immediately; Sutton’s (1994) list, on the other hand, includes a woman who died on 
April 17th, 1976, three weeks after being injured in a bomb attack on an exhibition hall in 
London. Without question, both observations relate to the same event. Thus, the RAND 
data adequately capture Northern Irish terrorism in Great Britain. The same seems to be the 
case for the low-scale campaign of Welsh separatist groups, such as the Meibion Glyndwr.  
While we are confident about the completeness of the RAND data for Great Britain, this is 
not the case for Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Only 3% of the persons on 
Sutton’s (1994) list killed in Northern Ireland and only 13% of the persons on Sutton’s 
(1994) list killed in the Republic of Ireland are recorded in the RAND data. Therefore, for 
the Republic of Ireland, we supplement the RAND data with the TWEED data. The 
TWEED data record a good deal of Northern Ireland-related incidents perpetrated in the 
Republic of Ireland. In order to avoid double counting of incidents, we exclude all 
incidents that are already recorded in the RAND data by comparing information 
concerning the date, perpetrator, target etc. of the incidents in the two datasets. The two 
datasets thus combined contain 26% of the persons on Sutton’s (1994) list. Again, the 26% 
underestimate the true congruence for fatal attacks because a large number of persons on 
Sutton’s (1994) list are victims of feuds in paramilitary groups, neutralized informers, 
 12 
abductees, or persons shot in armed robberies. For Northern Ireland itself, we use statistics 
on the number of incidents provided by the PSNI. The RAND data, focusing on 
international terrorism, almost entirely disregard incidents related to the Troubles if they 
are perpetrated in Northern Ireland. Figure 3 depicts the annual number of terrorist attacks 
for Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
In the Republic of Ireland, no clear pattern is visible. In Great Britain, the number of 
attacks peaked in the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s. Measured in terms of the 
number of attacks, the climax of violence in Northern Ireland occurred in the years before 
1976 (or, alternatively, 1977). By far the most attacks were perpetrated in Northern 
Ireland; the number of attacks is around 960 times higher compared to the Republic of 
Ireland and around 80 times higher compared to Great Britain. In Figure 3, the part of the 
bars for Great Britain above the partitions represents the number of attacks that are not 
related to the Northern Ireland conflict. 
Terrorist fatalities. For the British Isles, the variable on the number of fatalities is 
constructed on the basis of the RAND data and Sutton’s (1994) list. The latter is not 
restricted to terrorism in particular, but includes political violence in general. Though the 
PIRA was always the highest taker of life, killing civilians, security forces and prison staff, 
the UDA and UVF were also very active; the interaction between these groups is generally 
referred to as sectarian ‘tit-for-tat’ exchanges (McKittrick and McVea 2001, p. 109-110). 
Feuds, such as the ones between the Provisional and Official IRA in 1975 and between the 
UDA and UVF in 2000, as well as hunger strikes on the part of imprisoned IRA members 
in 1981, added to the death toll. On the other hand, a considerable number died at the hand 
of security forces. British paratroopers killed 14 demonstrators on the Bloody Sunday of 
1972, British intelligence played a part in the Dublin and Monaghan bombing in 1974, and 
the army’s undercover SAS regiment staged ambushes in which IRA members – and 
innocent bystanders – were shot, to name but a few examples. Sutton’s (1994) list is one of 
the most comprehensive published records on the deaths in the Troubles; it only excludes 
deaths indirectly due to the Troubles, such as those caused by army vehicles and heart 
attacks (see Fay, Morrissey and Smyth 1999, pp. 125-132, for a comparison of different 
lists). In combining the RAND data and Sutton’s (1994) list, we again use the detailed 
information on the attacks in order to avoid double-counting. Deaths from attacks not 
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related to the Northern Ireland conflict are limited to Great Britain (part of the bars for 
Great Britain in Figure 4 above the partition) and occur neither in the Republic of Ireland 
nor Northern Ireland. The deaths are in large part related to spillover terrorism from the 
Middle East. The annual number of fatalities for Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland is shown in Figure 4. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
In the Republic of Ireland, the number of fatalities is decreasing; in Great Britain, no clear 
trend is visible, except for a small peak in the second half of the 1980s. Even more 
pronounced than the number of attacks, the number of fatalities in Northern Ireland 
plummeted in 1977. This corresponds to the observations of McKittrick and McVea (2001, 
p. 133) that 1977 “was a true turning-point in that violence fell dramatically, and would 
never again rise to the scale experienced in the 1971-76 period.” Nevertheless, the number 
of fatalities remained high for the whole period under consideration. As with the number of 
attacks, Northern Ireland had the largest death toll, with between around 20 and 75 times 
the number of fatalities compared to Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland respectively. 
3.2 Empirical strategy 
Based on the described datasets, micro-econometric happiness functions are specified. 
Individual life satisfaction, LSirt, i.e., the life satisfaction of individual i living in region r at 
time t, is explained by differences in the level of terrorism, Trt, across regions and over 
time, the log of individual household income, mirt, other personal characteristics Zirt, as 
well as region and time fixed effects ρr and τt, respectively. The specification is 
summarized in the following equation: 
(1) LSirt = β0 + β1Trt + β2ln(mirt) + β3Zirt + ρr + τt + εirt. 
Throughout the paper, we use a robust estimator of variance, because random disturbances 
are potentially correlated within groups or clusters, here cross-sectional units for a specific 
year. We estimate least square regressions, as well as ordered probit regressions due to the 
originally ordinal nature of the dependent variable. The results are qualitatively and 
quantitatively very similar for the two estimation approaches. For ease of interpretation, 
results from least square regressions are presented.8 However, the compensating surplus is 
calculated based on estimates from both kinds of regressions. 
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3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Basic results 
As can be seen from Table 1, terrorism negatively affects people’s self-reported life 
satisfaction in a sizeable and statistically significant way. An increase of one standard 
deviation in the number of recorded incidents, i.e., an increase of 154.03 incidents in the 
British Isles and an increase of 5.59 incidents in France, lowers life satisfaction by 0.012 
and 0.013 points respectively on the four-point scale. An increase of one standard 
deviation in the number of recorded fatalities, i.e., an increase of 14.42 in the British Isles 
and of 1.78 in France, lowers life satisfaction by 0.009 points in both countries. These are 
large effects, indicating that a reduction of the terrorist threat by one standard deviation is 
equivalent to shifting between 0.9 and 1.3% of the population of France and the British 
Isles from, for example, not very satisfied [2] to fairly satisfied [3] with the life they lead. 
These effects in terms of life satisfaction offer one way of valuing a public bad with the 
LSA. They could be compared with estimates for other public goods or bads. For a 
valuation in monetary terms, estimates for the marginal utility of income have to be taken 
into consideration. Table 1 includes the respective estimations. Coefficients for 
(household) income are positive and highly statistically significant. The partial correlation 
between log income and life satisfaction for the British Isles is around 0.167 and around 
0.250 for France. Thus, when income is doubled an average 0.116 points higher life 
satisfaction is reported in the British Isles, and an average 0.173 points higher life 
satisfaction in France. 
[Table 1 about here] 
For the estimates in Table 1, the cross-section variance is based on three regions per 
country. This geographical organization of the data is chosen on a priori reasoning with 
regard to diffusion of fear from terrorist attacks (see the discussion in section 2.2 on the 
identification of utility changes). However, the Euro-Barometer Survey Series allow 
identification based on a higher resolution of the life satisfaction and terrorism data. For 
the British Isles, 13 regions can be differentiated: the Republic of Ireland, Northern 
Ireland, Scotland, Wales, the eight Standard Statistical Regions of England and Greater 
London. For France, the data can be disaggregated on the level of the 21 régions of 
continental France (including Corsica). Based on this higher resolution data, the coefficient 
for the number of incidents decreases by 1.4% to -7.5E-5 (t-value: -3.90) in the case of the 
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British Isles, and by 19.7% to -1.8E-3 (t-value: -2.74) in the case of France; the coefficient 
for the number of fatalities decreases by 1.3% to -6.3E-4 (t-value: -3.89) in the case of the 
British Isles, and by 25.4% to -3.7E-3 (t-value: -1.83) in the case of France.9 Thus, highly 
disaggregated data persistently yield smaller estimates. In particular, this is the case for 
France. For the British Isles, the results are quite stable, probably because two of the three 
regions, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, are not further disaggregated.  
In the following sub-sections, the baseline regressions are modified in order to check the 
validity and plausibility of the results and to derive further insights. First, we analyze the 
sensitivity of the estimates to the exclusion of individual region-year combinations. 
Second, we include variables capturing the economic situation, more precisely the growth 
rate of the GDP per capita and the unemployment rate, in order to address issues of 
simultaneity. Including these macro-economic variables also allows us to determine 
whether terrorism affects life satisfaction through contemporary effects on the economy. 
Third, as a further test to rule out that the effect of terrorism on life satisfaction is spurious, 
we interact terrorism with dummy variables for sub-groups of the population that are 
expected to suffer disproportionately from terrorism. In this way, the relatively insensitive 
group controls for other simultaneous and spatially coincident shocks. 
3.3.2 Sensitivity to the exclusion of single observations 
In 1982, an unprecedented number of 66 terrorist attacks took place in Paris, a number 
never reached in subsequent years (see Figure 1). Similarly, in Northern Ireland, recorded 
fatalities in the years 1975 and 1976 by far outnumbered the fatalities of subsequent years 
(see Figure 4). In order to investigate whether the negative correlation between terrorism 
and life satisfaction is largely driven by such observations, we repeatedly ran the 
regressions reported in Table 1, in each round excluding the observations for one region-
year combination. For the British Isles, the coefficient for the number of incidents varies 
between -6.2E-5 (t-value: -3.89) and -9.1E-5 (t-value: -4.98). Compared to the point 
estimate for the whole sample, the deviations are below ±20%. The coefficient for the 
number of fatalities varies between -5.0E-4 (t-value: -3.73) and -8.2E-4 (t-value: -3.86) or 
+22% and -28% compared to the whole sample. The coefficient for the number of 
incidents in France is less robust: it varies between -1.9E-3 (t-value: -3.32), a relative 
deviation of 14%, and -4.5E-3 (t-value: -2.98), a relative deviation of -105%. The large 
negative partial correlation is estimated if the observations for Paris in 1982 are excluded, 
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i.e., the region and year with the highest number of attacks in France. The inclusion of 
these observations does not drive the negative correlation: on the contrary, a smaller 
negative effect is estimated when the full sample is taken into account. The coefficient for 
the number of fatalities in France varies between -3.9E-3 (t-value: -1.83) and -6.0E-3 (t-
value: -3.19), i.e., relative deviations of +30% and -20%. This statistical exercise shows 
that the coefficients are relatively stable, although there are clearly influential observations. 
An exception is the effect for the number of incidents in France. All estimates are 
comfortably below zero. 
3.3.3 Simultaneity and economic conditions 
One might argue that the negative correlation between terrorism and life satisfaction could 
be spurious because the state of the economy may be (negatively) correlated with the 
intensity of terrorist campaigns. If a high level of terrorist activity is generally 
accompanied by a slackening of the economy, people may report lower life satisfaction 
because they fear job reductions rather than terrorist attacks. Such a negative relationship 
between economic and terrorist activity is probable and can be due to two different causal 
processes. On the one hand, bad economic conditions and high levels of unemployment 
may facilitate the recruitment of rank and file activists. On the other hand, terrorism may 
dampen economic activity. 
McKittrick and McVea (2001, p. 28) presume the first causal relationship for Northern 
Ireland when writing that “[i]t is scarcely a coincidence that some of the areas which 
featured prominently in the troubles […] were among those where […] high 
unemployment persisted.” However, neither micro-level nor macro-level studies find 
evidence in support of this causal direction. Analyzing the characteristics of members of 
Israeli extremists, the Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Krueger and 
Maleckova (2003) and Berrebi (2003) find that poverty does not increase the propensity to 
participate in terrorism. If anything, terrorists, including suicide bombers, come from the 
ranks of the better off in society. Opinion polls conducted in the West Bank and Gaza strip 
find little evidence to suggest that a deteriorating economy increases support for terrorism. 
Time-series analyses fail to find a significant relationship between terrorism and GDP 
growth in Israel (Berrebi 2003; Krueger and Maleckova 2003). For Spain, time-series data 
for the tourism industry and terrorism indicate that terrorism affects tourism, but not the 
reverse (Enders and Sandler 1991). Finally, according to cross-country studies, poverty 
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does not increase terrorism risk, as assessed by an international risk agency (Abadie 2006) 
or reflected in the number of international terrorist attacks (Piazza 2006), nor do 
perpetrators predominantly stem from poor countries (Krueger and Laitin 2003; Klitgaard, 
Justesen and Klemmensen 2006). In sum, contrary to popular opinion, the preponderance 
of evidence suggests that there is no economic foundation for terrorism. Moreover, in the 
case of international terrorism, most perpetrators come from abroad. Economic conditions 
in the target region are therefore unlikely to influence the amount of terrorism. 
The other causal connection is better documented. In the last few years, economic scholars 
have provided evidence for adverse effects of terrorism on various sectors of the economy 
and on overall economic activity (e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; see Frey, 
Luechinger and Stutzer 2007 for a review). Panel data estimates of the determinants of 
investment and employment in the Northern Ireland manufacturing sector indicate that 
variations in the intensity of political conflict have a large and significant impact on 
economic activity (Fielding 2003). A 20% increase in the number of fatalities reduced 
investment in machinery and equipment by about 5.6% in equilibrium and construction 
investment by about 4.5%; the short-term reductions in investment to a one-period increase 
in the number of fatalities by one standard-deviation is well over 25%. The effects for 
employment are less pronounced and are sensitive to the data used. 
In order to control for the potential simultaneity between high levels of political violence 
and a slackening of the economy, and in order to see whether part of the negative effect of 
terrorism on life satisfaction works through contemporaneous effects on economic activity, 
we include the growth rate of GDP per capita and the unemployment rate as additional 
control variables in the micro-econometric life satisfaction functions. We are confident that 
these two variables are able to adequately capture the general economic situation; the need 
for data which are regionally disaggregated and date back over several decades 
considerably restricts the availability of further data. Data for France are only available 
since 1976. Table 2 presents the results. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Coefficients for both indicators of terrorism remain of similar magnitude and statistical 
significance when business cycle effects are controlled for. Most coefficients even increase 
slightly. In the case of the British Isles, the coefficient for the number of incidents 
increases by 5%, and the coefficient for the number of fatalities by 19%. In the case of 
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France, the coefficient for the number of incidents increases by 9%, whereby an increase 
of 3% is due to the change in the sample, and an increase of 6% is due to the inclusion of 
macro-economic variables. The coefficient for the number of fatalities remains constant 
because the change due to the adjusted sample and the change due to the inclusion of the 
macro-economic variables offset each other; the former amounts to -4%, and the latter to 
+4%. Thus, neither does the course of the economy spuriously cause the negative 
correlation between terrorism and life satisfaction, nor are the contemporaneous economic 
effects of terrorism an important channel through which terrorism affects life satisfaction. 
Note though that household income and individual employment status have already been 
included in the baseline estimations. 
The regions specific macro-economic variables have the expected effect on life 
satisfaction, but only in a statistically significant way in the sample for the British Isles. 
3.3.4 Differential effects for different sub-groups of the population 
We estimate differential effects of terrorism on life satisfaction for different sub-groups as 
an additional means of addressing potential simultaneity problems. If terrorism is found to 
affect different groups differently in a way that corresponds to prior expectations, this 
enhances our confidence that the estimated correlations are not caused by simultaneous 
and spatially coincident shocks. Unlike terrorism, these shocks are assumed to have the 
same effect on all sub-groups. The problem with this approach is to find groups that are 
likely to suffer disproportionately from terrorism. Terrorist attacks kill people 
indiscriminately and unpredictably. Bombs exploding on the Paris metro or wrecking 
crowded pubs in Birmingham kill people from all walks of life. In Northern Ireland, people 
were killed randomly in so-called “doorstep killings” whereby victims were shot on 
answering the door. Even wider is the circle of the bereaved. Although a majority of the 
victims of the Northern Ireland conflict were male and young (Fay, Morrissey and Smyth 
1999, pp. 161-163), we do not find larger effects of terrorism on life satisfaction for these 
groups, probably because they are under-represented among the bereaved. 
We identify three sub-groups. First, we hypothesize respondents living in rural areas to be 
less affected than respondents living in towns and cities. Terrorists often strike in cities in 
order to increase the death toll and secure media attention. In Northern Ireland, some 
scholars distinguish a “rural war” from other types of conflicts. This war was fought 
between the protagonists themselves and resulted in a remarkably different profile of 
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victims: “[…] a high proportion of casualties were members of the security forces who did 
not live in the area” (Fay, Morrissey and Smyth 1999, p. 143). Therefore, fear, empathy 
and grief are expected to be lower among rural residents. Second, social psychology 
demonstrates that religiosity plays an outstanding role in the list of factors that help people 
cope with the threat of terrorism (Peterson and Seligman 2003; Fischer et al. 2006). Hence, 
we expect self-reported agnostics and atheists to suffer more from terrorism. Finally, in the 
case of Northern Ireland, Catholics were at greater risk of being injured or killed in both 
absolute and relative terms (Fay, Morrissey and Smyth 1999, p. 165). Thus the third 
differentiation is with regard to denomination. The results are reported in Table 3. Because 
the information on the type of living area and religious denomination is not included in all 
waves of the Euro-Barometer Survey Series, Table 3 also contains the effect of terrorism 
on life satisfaction for the whole population in the respective sub-samples. 
[Table 3 about here] 
As can be seen from Table 3, the estimates are consistent with the hypotheses. The effect 
of terrorism on life satisfaction for people living in rural areas is only between one half and 
two thirds of the size of the effect for people living in urban areas; for the number of 
incidents in France, the negative effect vanishes almost entirely. According to all models, 
agnostics are more heavily affected by terrorism than their religious counterparts, in the 
British Isles by a factor of 1.5, in France by a factor of 3.3 to 6.5. Finally, Catholics suffer 
more from political violence in the British Isles, although the difference is less pronounced 
compared to the other subgroup effects.  
3.4 Monetization 
With the estimated coefficients of the micro-econometric life satisfaction functions for 
terrorism (
1
!ˆ ) and income (
2
!ˆ ), people’s implicit willingness-to-pay for a reduction in 
terrorism can be calculated. Wiliness-to-pay is measured by the compensating surplus 
(CS). The CS is the decrease in income necessary to hold utility constant. In other words, 
the CS is the solution to the following expression: 
(2) v(mi0; Ti0) = v(mi0 – CS; Ti1), 
where v(·) is the utility function, mr0 the initial household income, Ti0 the initial level of 
terrorism and Ti1 the level after a hypothetical reduction. According to the specification of 
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the micro-econometric happiness function expressed in equation (1) and the definition of 
the CS in equation (2), the CS can be computed as follows:  
(3) ))ˆˆexp(1( 1210 ii TmCS !""#=
#$$ , 
Estimates are presented for people living in particular terrorism-prone regions. 
Specifically, we calculate the hypothetical willingness-to-pay of residents in Paris and 
Northern Ireland for a reduction in the number of incidents and the number of fatalities to 
bring them on a par with the rest of France (except for the region Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur) and the rest of Great Britain respectively. All CSs are calculated for an individual 
with the average annual household income. The results reported in Table 4 are based on 
coefficients from least square estimations (Table 1) and from ordered probit estimations 
(available on request). 
[Table 4 about here] 
According to the results shown in Table 4, for a reduction in terrorist activity to a level that 
prevails in the more peaceful parts of the country, a resident of Northern Ireland would be 
willing to pay between 26% (if terrorism is measured by the number of fatalities) and 37% 
(if terrorism is measured by the number of incidents) of his income. A resident of Paris 
would be willing to forego between 4% (number of fatalities) and 8% (number of 
incidents) of his income. As can be seen from Table 4, ordered probit estimations produce 
similar results; the respective numbers are 27%, 38%, 4% and 8%. Table 4 reports not only 
the point estimates but also the respective standard errors of the CS estimates. Standard 
errors are bootstrapped, based on 1,000 repetitions taking into account that CS is calculated 
based on the ratio of two estimated variables. According to the standard errors and 
respective confidence intervals, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two terrorism 
indicators, the number of fatalities and the number of incidents, generate the same results. 
For a resident of Northern Ireland, the 95% confidence interval of the CS for a reduction in 
the number of fatalities is 17% to 34%, and the confidence interval for a reduction in the 
number of incidents is 29% to 46%. For France, the respective 95% confidence intervals 
are 1% to 7% and 3% to 13%. Hence, the CS estimates for France are significantly lower 
than the CS estimates for the British Isles. 
We put the main results for the CSs into perspective. The result for France, on the one 
hand, is comparable to the compensations which Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1988) 
identified on the labor and housing market in the United States for individuals living in the 
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county with the highest rate of violent crime vis à vis individuals living in the county with 
the least crime. The compensation according to Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1988) 
amounts to $2,267, or to 11% of the annual household income. 
The result for Northern Ireland, on the other hand, to some extent reflects the ferocity of 
the conflict. The number of incidents and fatalities depicted in Figures 3 and 4 give a sense 
of this ferocity. Fay, Morrissey and Smyth (1999, p. 204) estimate that around two-thirds 
of the Northern Irish population live in households where someone has been injured in a 
conflict-related incident; the number of around 30,000 republican and loyalist ex-prisoners 
illustrates how deeply society was permeated by paramilitarism (McKittrick and McVea 
2001, p. 150).  
In addition, curfews, rigorous house-to-house searches, several thousand people fleeing 
their homes and large-scale riots accompanied the worst times of the conflict. The 
statements of two senior policemen summarize the situation: “The country stared into the 
face of great difficulty and crept right to the edge of the abyss,” and “We were on the brink 
of all-out civil war” (cited in McKittrick and McVea 2001, p. 211). 
Given the ferocity of this conflict and our high estimate of a CS, one might wonder why a 
mass exodus out of Northern Ireland was not observed. One reason might be that residents 
of Northern Ireland indeed got massive compensation for living in Northern Ireland: 
Without invoking a direct relationship to the figures presented in Table 4, transfers from 
Great Britain to Northern Ireland (excluding defense and courts expenditures) averaged 
one-fourth of the Northern Irish GDP, or a third of income created in Northern Ireland 
itself, in the time-period considered.  
These subsidies support relatively well-paid jobs in manufacturing (over 90% of the 
manufacturing jobs are subsidized) and the public sector. They finance the health and 
welfare system as well as subsidized housing (Fay, Morrissey and Smyth 1999, pp. 110-
113). Thus, a large proportion of the population in Northern Ireland benefit directly. 
Additional transfers to Northern Ireland take the form of compensation payments for losses 
and injuries, expenditures for security and justice, and subsidies from the European Union. 
(With regard to the identification of utility losses caused by terrorism, it is important to 
note that these transfers do not vary with the level of terrorist activity.) 
However, despite these enormous transfers, numerous people did leave Northern Ireland in 
reaction to the violence, as Figure 5 suggests (see also Registrar General Northern Ireland 
various years). 
[Figure 5 about here] 
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Another reason for a high CS for lower terrorist activity might be people’s difficulty in 
assessing terrorism-risks. According to Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003), people are subject 
to a propensity to predict worst-case scenarios and are prone to anomalies known from 
other risk perception contexts. Hindsight bias and embeddedness effects are particularly 
evident for terrorism-risk perception. Downes-Le Guin and Hoffman (1993) contend that 
much higher probabilities are accorded to terrorism than to other life-threatening acts. 
Sunstein (2003), on the other hand, finds that individuals focus on the badness of the 
outcome rather than on the probability that it will occur. The “probability neglect” results 
in fear that greatly exceeds discounted harm. These results suggest that people are far more 
concerned with terrorism than with objectively larger risks. 
Becker and Rubinstein (2004) also assert that terrorism can have consequences beyond 
what the underlying probabilities would suggest. But rather than attributing this to 
cognitive limitations in risk assessing, they base their explanation on an additional “fear 
factor”: An exogenous increase in risk not only affects utility by changing the 
probabilities, but also by reducing the utility enjoyed from the consumption of risky 
activities, such as riding a bus after suicide attacks on buses. As Becker and Rubinstein 
(2004, p. 7) observe, “[b]y generating fear, terror, even in the form of a low probability 
event, may generate substantial effects.” Calibrating a benchmark utility function to fit the 
data of Israeli bus demand and using commonly accepted values for the risk aversion 
parameter, they estimate the marginal utility of a bus ride to fall by 10 to 20% if suicide 
bomber attacks are carried on buses. 
Thus, equating the terrorism with the probability of dying entirely misses the distinctive 
feature of terrorism, i.e., to spread terror. Whether far-reaching consequences are explained 
by cognitive limitations or fear, perceptions of terrorism are mainly influenced by the 
salience of the topic. Intense media coverage of terrorist acts ensures that terrorism is very 
present in people’s minds. The high number of fatalities in violent periods of the conflict in 
Northern Ireland, for example, means “that hardly a newspaper or evening television 
programme did not bring news of either a killing or a funeral” (McKittrick and McVea 
2001, p. 94), and that “the local television news seemed to consist of nothing except more 
and more violence, the grieving bereaved, and threats of more to come” (McKittrick and 
McVea 2001, p. 194). 
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4. Concluding remarks 
No doubt, terrorism and regional conflict are important sources of misery. There are 
psychic costs that go far beyond the economic losses from terrorism traditionally studied in 
economics. But how large are these psychic costs? We apply the LSA as a tool to value the 
overall social costs of terrorism.  
People’s welfare losses caused by terrorist activity are estimated, based on panel data for 
terrorist attacks and fatalities and reported life satisfaction between 1973/75 and 2002. The 
results for France and the British Isles demonstrate that terrorist campaigns depress the life 
satisfaction of the individuals in the affected regions in a sizeable way. For a change in 
fatalities by one standard deviation in France, the effect amounts to 1/44 of the reduction in 
life satisfaction when unemployed rather than employed or self-employed. The respective 
ratio is 1/23 for the British Isles. Calculating CSs, the costs of terrorism are around 4% of 
annual household income in France and around 26% in the British Isles when the most 
terrorist prone regions are compared to the least terrorist prone regions. The effects of 
terrorism are robust when controlling for possible simultaneity of terrorism and adverse 
economic conditions. 
We see the LSA as a promising approach for the valuation of important non-monetary 
costs of conflicts but also for the valuation of public goods and bads in general. In addition 
to any overall valuation, net distributional consequences of the provision of some public 
good can be studied. In our empirical analysis, for example, people living in urban areas 
rather than rural areas suffer more from terrorism. While overall valuations can provide 
valuable information for cost-benefit analyses, findings for differential effects can help to 
understand the intensity of support for the provision of some public goods in the political 
process. We expect many new insights from research in both directions in the near future. 
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1 For an overview and further references on the economics of terrorism, see e.g. Enders and Sandler 
(1995), Frey and Luechinger (2003), Frey (2004), Enders and Sandler (2006) or the special issue of 
Public Choice on terrorism with contributions by Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen and Klemmensen 
(2006), Rowley (2006) and Shughart (2006) among others. An alternative approach for valuing the 
benefits from homeland security is offered in Sandler et al. (2008). 
2 Of course, the possibility of strategic answering behavior cannot be completely ruled out with the 
LSA. For example, it may be that respondents living in terrorized regions strategically report an 
overly low life satisfaction, anticipating that researchers will use their reported life satisfaction 
several years later to value – among other things – national security. However, although such a 
scenario is theoretically possible, we do not think that it is very likely. The crucial argument is that 
with the LSA, reported life satisfaction is related ex post to terrorist activity by researchers. 
3 Throughout the paper Great Britain refers to England, Scotland, Wales and several smaller 
islands, United Kingdom refers to Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and British Isles refers to the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. 
4 According to RAND St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism (see section 3.1 for a 
description), France had 520 international terrorist incidents in the period under consideration 
followed by the Federal Republic of Germany with 425. International terrorism is defined as 
terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. 
5 Experienced utility follows an interpretation of utility in hedonistic terms broadly understood. 
This interpretation contrasts with today’s standard decision utility. Decision utility is a 
representation of preferences as derived from choices. We follow here the terminology proposed by 
Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997) to differentiate between the two concepts. There are many 
research questions where it is useful to take experienced utility measured by reported subjective 
well-being as a proxy for decision utility and vice versa. However, there is evidence indicating that, 
in certain situations, the two concepts systematically diverge (see e.g. Kahneman and Thaler 2006). 
6 A third possibility is to instrument the variance of the public good, which is an almost hopeless 
undertaking in the case of terrorism. 
7 Note that respondents’ education is not included in the vector of personal characteristics. 
Education is highly correlated with lifetime income and, therefore, likely to take away explanatory 
power from the income variable. Further, in order to translate the utility losses caused by terrorism 
into monetary terms, the effect of income on life satisfaction per se is needed rather than the effect 
of within-education variation in income. However, the results are similar if education is controlled 
for. 
8 Results for ordered probit regressions are available from the authors on request. 
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9 Note that it is not possible to compare the t-values directly. Because robust standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering on region and year level, we have fewer degrees of freedom in the estimates 
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Note : For Great Britain, the bars above partition denote attacks not related to the ‘Troubles’ .
Sources : RAND -St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, provided by MIPT
(www.mipt .org), Sutton (1994 ) and an updated version of the Sutton index provided by CAIN
Web Service (www .cain .ulst .ac .uk), and statistics provided by the PSNI (www .psni .police .uk) .





























































































































































Figure 4 . Number of terrorist fatalities in the British Isles, 1975-2002
Note : For Great Britain, the bars above partition denote attacks not related to the ‘Troubles’ .
Sources : RAND -St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, provided by MIPT
(www.mipt .org), Sutton (1994 ) and an updated version of the Sutton index provided by CAIN




































































































Figure 5. Fatalities in Northern Ireland and net migration (in % of population)
Notes: The Registrar General publishes two overlapping but not entirely consistent series of 
migration; both are shown in figure 5.
Sources: Sutton (1994) and an updated version of the Sutton index provided by CAIN Web Service 
(www.cain.ulst.ac.uk), and Registrar General (various years).  
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Table 1. Basic results: Effect of terrorism on life satisfaction, U.K., Ireland and France, 1973-2002 
To be continued. 
 British Isles France 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Life satisfaction Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
Terrorism             
  Incidents -7.6E-5 ** -3.90    -2.2E-3 ** -2.74    
  Fatalities    -6.4E-4 ** -3.45    -5.0E-3 * -2.50 
HH income             
  ln(HH income) 0.168 ** 19.12 0.167 ** 19.03 0.250 ** 20.29 0.250 ** 20.23 
  HH size1/2 -0.095 ** -7.84 -0.094 ** -7.77 -0.160 ** -12.13 -0.160 ** -12.09 
Personal characteristics             
  Male Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Female 0.081 ** 11.82 0.081 ** 11.80 0.033 ** 3.85 0.033 ** 3.87 
  Age -0.016 ** -12.24 -0.016 ** -12.32 -0.022 ** -12.33 -0.022 ** -12.33 
  Age2 2.E-4 ** 14.41 2.E-4 ** 14.48 2.E-4 ** 12.04 2.E-4 ** 12.05 
  Single Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Married 0.079 ** 6.29 0.079 ** 6.31 0.057 ** 4.10 0.057 ** 4.09 
  Living together 0.002  0.09 0.001  0.07 0.022  1.44 0.022  1.44 
  Separated -0.277 ** -9.45 -0.277 ** -9.42 -0.179 ** -4.99 -0.179 ** -5.00 
  Divorced -0.209 ** -8.99 -0.209 ** -8.98 -0.146 ** -6.20 -0.147 ** -6.22 
  Widowed -0.099 ** -5.89 -0.099 ** -5.91 -0.105 ** -4.76 -0.106 ** -4.78 
  No children in HH Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  One child -0.025 (*) -1.74 -0.025 (*) -1.73 0.012  0.64 0.012  0.62 
  Two children -0.016  -0.96 -0.016  -0.97 0.061 * 2.56 0.060 * 2.53 
  Three children -0.023  -0.87 -0.023  -0.88 0.076 * 2.58 0.075 * 2.56 
  Four and more children -0.025  -0.94 -0.025  -0.96 -0.081  -1.21 -0.082  -1.22 
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Table 1, part 2. 
 British Isles France 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
  Employed or self-employed Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Other occupation 0.130 ** 6.85 0.130 ** 6.84 0.239 ** 9.81 0.239 ** 9.82 
  Housekeeping -0.038 ** -3.55 -0.038 ** -3.55 0.061 ** 4.79 0.061 ** 4.78 
  Retired -0.002  -0.16 -0.002  -0.15 0.152 ** 7.17 0.152 ** 7.16 
  Unemployed -0.411 ** -18.83 -0.410 ** -18.80 -0.202 ** -8.35 -0.202 ** -8.35 
  Living in rural area Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Living in small towns -0.051 ** -5.27 -0.051 ** -5.26 -0.065 ** -5.66 -0.066 ** -5.68 
  Living in a big town -0.120 ** -11.90 -0.120 ** -11.91 -0.078 ** -6.03 -0.078 ** -6.10 
Region specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations   62,320   62,320   38,062   38,062 
Number of clusters   75   75   76   76 
Prob > F   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
R2   0.079   0.079    0.074    0.074 
Notes: (1) OLS estimates. (2) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within regions per year. (3) ** is significant at the 99% level, * at the 95% level, and (*) 
at the 90% level. 
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Table 2. Robustness check: Effect of terrorism on life satisfaction controlling for macro-economic variables 
 British Isles France 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Life satisfaction Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Terrorism             
  Incidents -8.0E-5 ** -4.49    -2.4E-3 ** -3.12    
  Fatalities    -7.6E-4 ** -4.07    -5.0E-3 ** -2.64 
Macro-economic variables             
  GDP per capita growth 0.719 * 2.01 0.791 * 2.10 0.378  0.93 0.324  0.80 
  Unemployment rate growth -0.071 (*) -1.71 -0.073 (*) -1.70 -0.041  -0.57 -0.043  -0.59 
HH income             
  ln(HH income) 0.168 ** 18.98 0.168 ** 18.89 0.252 ** 20.89 0.252 ** 20.81 
  HH size1/2 -0.094 ** -7.97 -0.093 ** -7.87 -0.163 ** -12.23 -0.163 ** -12.18 
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations   62,320   62,320   34,529   34,529 
Number of clusters   75   75   70   70 
Prob > F   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
R2   0.080   0.080   0.075   0.075 
Notes: (1) OLS estimates. (2) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within regions per year. (3) ** is significant at the 99% level, * at the 95% level, and (*) 
at the 90% level. 
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Table 3. Interaction effects: Effect of terrorism on life satisfaction for different groups 
Dependent Variable British Isles France 
Life satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Terrorism                 
  Incidents -8.0E-5 ** -9.8E-5 **     -2.0E-3 * -2.1E-3 *     
 (-3.90)  (-4.05)      (-2.50)  (-2.51)      
  Fatalities     -6.9E-4 ** -9.1E-4 **     -4.7E-3 * -5.0E-3 * 
     (-3.45)  (-4.31)      (-2.26)  (-2.41)  
Sub-group of interest                 
  Living in rural area 0.057 ** 0.053 ** 0.057 ** 0.052 ** 0.052 ** 0.045 ** 0.052 ** 0.050 ** 
 (9.37)  (8.28)  (9.38)  (8.11)  (7.54)  (4.73)  (7.56)  (5.84)  
Interaction terms                 
  Living in rural area · terror   3.8E-5 *   4.6E-4 *   1.9E-3    1.9E-3  
   (2.24)    (2.48)    (1.20)    (0.75)  
HH income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 55,137  55,137  55,137  55,137  31,412  31,412  31,412  31,412  
Number of clusters 63  63  63  63  61  61  61  61  
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
R2 0.084  0.084  0.084  0.084  0.077  0.077  0.077  0.077  
Marginal effect of terror for                 
  Reference group   -9.8E-5 **   -9.1E-4 **   -2.1E-3 *   -5.0E-3 * 
  Sub-group of interest   -6.0E-5 **   -4.5E-4 *   -2.2E-4    -3.1E-3  
To be continued. 
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Table 3, part 2. 
Dependent Variable British Isles France 
Life satisfaction (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Terrorism                 
  Incidents -9.8E-5 ** -9.8E-5 **     -5.9E-3 * -3.3E-3      
 (-3.88)  (-3.91)      (-2.42)  (-1.17)      
  Fatalities     -7.9E-04 ** -7.9E-04 **     -6.1E-03  -2.0E-03  
     (-3.87)  (-3.89)      (-1.42)  (-0.45)  
Sub-group of interest                 
  Agnostic -0.053 ** -0.050 ** -0.052 ** -0.048 ** -0.083 ** -0.052 * -0.083 ** -0.072 ** 
 (-6.09)  (-5.62)  (-5.92)  (-5.21)  (-4.48)  (-2.49)  (-4.48)  (-3.91)  
Interaction terms                 
  Agnostic · terror   -4.0E-05    -4.2E-04    -7.6E-03 *   -1.1E-02 (*) 
   (-1.04)    (-0.79)    (-2.50)    (-1.77)  
HH income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 34,875  34,875  34,875  34,875  21,088  21,088  21,088  21,088  
Number of clusters 45  45  45  45  47  47  47  47  
Prob > F n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  
R2 0.084  0.084  0.083  0.083  0.075  0.076  0.075  0.075  
Marginal effect of terror for                 
  Reference group   -9.8E-05 **   -7.9E-04 **   -3.3E-03    -2.0E-03  
  Sub-group of interest   -1.4E-04 **   -1.2E-03 *   -1.1E-02 **   -1.3E-02 (*) 
To be continued. 
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Table 3, part 3. 
Dependent Variable British Isles 
Life satisfaction (17) (18) 
Terrorism     
  Incidents -9.5E-5 **   
 (-3.40)    
  Fatalities   -7.5E-04 ** 
   (-3.44)  
Sub-group of interest     
  Catholic -0.004  0.000  
 (-0.37)  (0.00)  
Interaction terms     
  Catholic · terror -1.3E-5  -2.1E-4  
 (-0.74)  (-1.04)  
HH income Yes Yes 
Personal characteristics Yes Yes 
Region specific effects Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes 
Number of observations 34,875  34,875  
Number of clusters 45  45  
Prob > F n.a.  n.a.  
R2 0.084  0.083  
Marginal effect of terror for     
  Reference group -9.5E-05 ** -7.5E-04 ** 
  Sub-group of interest -1.1E-04 ** -9.6E-04 ** 
Notes: (1) OLS estimates. (2) t-values are in parentheses. (3) 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within regions per year. 
(4) ** is significant at the 99% level, * at the 95% level, and (*) at 
the 90% level. 
 
Table 4. Compensating surplus for a reduction in terrorism 
 British Isles, 1975-1998 France, 1973-1998 
Average annual household income $20,501  $26,067 
Reduction of terrorism 1,022.76 acts 77.04 deaths 9.58 acts 2.16 deaths 
Basis: least square estimations (table 1) 
















Basis: ordered probit estimations 
















Notes: (1) CS is calculated for residents of Paris and of Northern Ireland for a reduction terrorism to the intensity of 
terrorism in the more peaceful parts of the respective countries. (2) CS estimates are in 2004 U.S. dollars. (3) 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1000 replications). 
 
 
